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What is the biometric passport 
 
The biometric passport is the new type of passports, which from October 2006 are required for 
entry to the US by the VWP (see also later on the section Types of biometric passports). The passports 
must contain an RFID-chip, which holds digitized information about the passport’s owner. The individual 
government decides much of the specific digital information, but certain demands are made by the US 
and the ICAO standard. 
As an example, a digitized photo of the passport’s owner is required both by the standard and by 
the US. Some of the information on the passport must also be optically readable. Other terms used 
include “electronic” or “digitized” passports, or simply E-passports or ePassports. 
EPassport is a term used for all passports that includes an electronic device, or Contactless 
Integrated Circuit (IC) such as a RFID chip. The RFID chip contains biometric data, so an ePassport is 
also a biometric passport. This definition is in compliance with the ICAO terminology. 
In other words, a biometric passport is a combined paper and electronic identity document that 
uses biometrics to authenticate the citizenship of travelers. The passport's critical information is stored on 
a tiny RFID  (Radio Frequency Identification)  computer chip, much like information stored 
on smartcards. Like some smartcards, the passport book design calls for an embedded contactless chip 
that is able to hold digital signature data to ensure the integrity of the passport and the biometric data. 
The current staged biometrics  for this type of identification system is facial 
recognition,  fingerprint  recognition, and iris scans. The International Civil Aviation Organisation 
defines the biometric standards to be used in passports. ICAO does not currently have plans to use retinal 
scanning. Only the digital image (usually in jpeg format) of each biometric feature is actually stored in 
the chip. The biometric algorithm is computed outside of the passport chip by electronic border control 
systems (e-borders). To store biometric data on the contactless chip, it includes a minimum of 32 
kilobytes of EEPROM storage memory, and runs on an interface in accordance with the ISO 14443 
international standard, amongst others. These standards ensure interoperability between the different 
countries and the different manufacturers of the passport books. 
 
Figure 1. Symbol for biometric passports, usually printed on the cover of the passports   
 
Biometric Technology Overview 
 
Fingerprinting The use of fingerprinting is well-known because of its use in forensic science and law 
enforcement. Large-scale fingerprint technology works by using coordinates of points on the fingerprint 
where ridges end or split. It is also possible to match the whole fingerprint pattern but such systems are 
rarely used on a large scale. 
There are two main ways of recording fingerprints: rolling and slapping. Rolled fingerprints are 
used in law enforcement where the maximum print is recorded. Slapped fingerprints only record the pad 
of the finger but the process is less intrusive. There are different types of fingerprint reader: slap readers 
(10 prints), single-finger optical readers, single-finger capacitive readers, ultrasound readers and rolled 
fingerprint readers. It is likely that the ID Cards Programme would use a 10-finger slap reader. 
The basic characteristics of fingerprints do not change, although fingerprints can be damaged by 
injury, burns or wear due to work. When recording fingerprints, it is important the finger is clean because 
any grease or dirt can distort the image. The image can also be distorted by pressure on the finger that 
alters the fingerprint pattern. 
There are hundreds of fingerprint companies but only four or five provide AFIS (automated 
finger identification systems). There are several large-scale fingerprint databases including the FBI AFIS 
database, which has a database of 47 million fingerprints and Ident1 in the UK, which holds six million 
sets of prints. 
 
Facial Recognition 
Facial recognition works by identifying people according to sections of the face least susceptible 
to alteration eg. upper outline of eye, sides of mouth, cheekbones. 
The two main methods are: local feature analysis and the Eigenface method. Local feature 
analysis measures the relative distances between landmarks on the face. The Eigenface method looks at 
the face as a whole and uses combinations of 2D templates that represent distinctive characteristics of a 
facial image. 
Face recognition readers vary greatly in technology and the lighting of the face can have a great 
effect upon the performance of the technology. There are approximately 10 companies offering 3D 
technology and less than 100 companies offering 2D solutions. 
 
Iris Scanning 
Iris recognition measures the iris pattern in the colored part of the eye. Iris patterns are formed 
randomly at birth and iris patterns are different for every eye. The iris can have more than 250 distinct 
features compared with 40 or 50 comparison points for fingerprints. 
Iris scanning involves a camera capturing an image of one or both eyes. The camera focuses on 
the eye, locates the iris and accounts for areas obstructed by eyelashes or eyelids. This image is broken 
into circular grids and each area is analyzed for unique patterns. This information is converted into an 
algorithm in the camera that can be used as a template. 
Iris patterns are unique, even between identical twins, and these patterns are stable throughout 
life. There can be some difficulties with iris scanning if individuals are wearing glasses or contact lenses, 
if they have aniridia (lack an iris) or glaucoma. 
The iris recognition market  is currently dominated by Iridian, although it may become 
increasingly competitive as patents expire. Iris performance statistics from independent tests are limited to 
100’s. However, the technology is widely used in the United Arab Emirates, which has a database of over 
350,000 iris scans. 
 
Biometry in passports 
 
Biometry is used to identify people by measuring some aspect of one's individual anatomy or 
physiology, such as fingerprint, facial features, iris, DNA or simply a photograph. In digital form, this 
measurement is usually called a template. It should be unique for each person. The attractive features of biometric measurements are that people always carry them around, that they are usually non-trivial to 
fake, and that the identification process can be automated (to a large extend).  
Basically, there are 2 ways to use a biometric system.  
•  Verification: given both a person and a template, is there a match?  
•  Identification: given a measurement of a (as yet unknown) person, for instance a fingerprint at a 
crime scene or a picture from a surveillance camera, is there a matching template in the database, 
so that the identity of the owner of the biometric datum can be established?  
In practice there is not always a perfect match between templates and individuals. One speaks of 
a false positive if the biometric recognition system says 'yes', but the answer should be 'no'. A false 
negative works the other way round: the system says 'no', where it should be a 'yes'. One of the main 
challenges with biometric systems is to minimise the rates of both false positives and of false 
negatives. In theory one is inclined to keep the false positives low, but in practical situations it often 
works the other way round: people that operate these systems hate false negatives, because they slow 
down the process and result in extra work and people complaining.  
When a PIN code is used to authenticate people (via "what you know"), it is not a disaster if the 
code is lost or compromised (known to others): you simply ask your bank for a new PIN code. However, 
this is not possible with biometric templates (using "what you are"): you can not simply get a new iris, 
fingerprint or DNA print. Hence, biometric templates carry sensitive and very private information, that 
should be handled with great care. Loss or compromise of biometric templates may lead to serious cases 
of identity theft. Restoration is basically impossible.  
Storing biometric templates 
When biometric information is used in a system such as a passport, the first question should 
always be: where is the biometric template stored, and how does the comparison with the measurements 
take place? More concretely, when a passport carries a chip with a biometric template, in a proper set-up, 
the template should never leave the chip, and the comparison should take place on the chip itself. Also, 
the device that does the measurement (e.g. an irisscanner) should be secure, in the sense that it does not 
leak information to the outside. In such a set-up it is important to check the authenticity of the 
passport/chip, because a fake one could always answer 'yes'.  
When the biometric templates are stored only in (the chip in) a passport, it can be used only for 
verification purposes, as explained above: to establish the relation between an individual and a passport. 
This will combat the so-called look-alike fraud.  
As argued, there are serious privacy concerns when biometric templates are stored outside 
passports, for instance in large databases. Such databases can be used in order to identify people, for 
instance when a fingerprint is found at a crime scene. Such application may be justifiable, but a large 
database raises serious privacy concerns: it can be misused to track the whereabouts of all individuals. 
Typically, a database is kept only of convicted criminals (of a sufficiently serious criminal act). But there 
is growing pressure towards centralized databases.  
Security mechanisms in the biometric passport 
The International Civil Aviation Organization  (ICAO)  has selected facial recognition (to be 
stored in chips) as main biometric for "machine readable" travel documents. Additional biometrics, such 
as fingerprints or iris scans are allowed, see their dedicated webpage with lots of material, including many standards documents. The biometric passport in the Netherlands (and likely also in Europe) will contain 
pictures of the face, and also of two fingers (left and right, in principle). The ICAO standards allow 
several levels of security. The Netherlands will implement the highest level.  
1.  Basic access control is optional (but implemented in NL), and means that the chip embedded in 
the passport will only respond after receiving a specific (cryptographic) key. This key can be 
derived (automatically) from the so-called Machine Readable Zone (MRZ). It is the two-line text 
at the bottom of a special page in the passport. It contains the passport number, name of the 
holder, date of birth, date of issuance, together with some check-bits. This basic access control is 
not really a security mechanism. It makes sure that the holder of the passport must physically 
hand over the document before it can be read. This is meant to establish consent.  
2.  Passive authentication is not optional. It is the checking of the signature of the so-called security 
document inside the passport. This security document contains hashes of all the crucial data. It is 
signed with the private key of the issuing state. The corresponding public key must be made 
available via some international PKI---also because these public-private key pairs should be 
renewed every three months. This passive authentication mechanism must prevent the fabrication 
of fake passports.  
3.  Active authentication  is optional, but also implemented in NL. It is a challenge-response 
mechanism with the card, where the card signs a challenge with its own private key. The 
corresponding public key can be read from the passport. Its hash is part of the security document 
(as in 2). This active authentication mechanism must prevent cloning of existing passports.  
4.  Extended authentication can be used to restrict access to some of the biometrical data. The 
facial image can simply be read out, once the basic access control protocol (from 1) has been 
carried out. The fingerprints however are encrypted (in a test version in the Netherlands). It is not 
clear yet which mechanism will be used for extended authentication.  
 
Types of biometric passports 
There are several types of biometric passports: 
 
o  European 
The European version of the passport is planned to have digital imaging and fingerprint scan 
biometrics placed on the contactless chip. This combination of the biometrics aims to create an unrivaled 
level of security and protection against counterfeit and fraudulent identification papers. Currently, the 
British biometric passport only uses a digital image and not fingerprinting, however this is being 
considered by the United Kingdom Passport Service. 
 
  
Figure 2. The contactless chip of the British National (Overseas) Passport. 
 
It can be seen below different types of European biometric passports. Also it can easily be 




o  U.S. 
The U.S. version of the biometric passport (which is also referred to as an "Electronic Passport") 
will only have digital imaging placed onto the contactless chip, as opposed to the European version. 
However, the chip used in the U.S. passport will be large enough (64 kilobytes) to allow it to contain 
additional biometric identifiers should the need arise in the future. The U.S. Department of State began 
issuing biometric passports to government officials and diplomats in early 2006. It began issuing regular 
biometric passports at its Colorado Passport Agency on August 14, 2006; though they still expect that 
nearly all new or renewed passports issued by the department to American citizens will be biometric by 
the end of 2006, other sources say it won't happen until mid-2007. 
A high level of security became a top priority in late 2001 for the United States. This tightened 
security required border control to take steps in cracking down on counterfeit paper passports. In October 
2004, the production stages of this high-tech passport commenced as the U.S. Government Printing 
Office (GPO) issued awards to the top bidders of the program. The awards totaled to roughly $1,000,000 
for startup, development, and testing. The driving force of the initiative is the U.S. Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (also known as the "Border Security Act"), which states that 
such smartcard IDs will be able to replace visas. As for foreigners traveling to the U.S., if they wish to 
enter U.S. visa-free under the Visa Waiver Program  (VWP), they are now are required to possess 
machine-readable passports that comply with international standards. Additionally, for travelers holding 
a valid passport issued on or after October 26, 2006, such a passport must be a biometric passport if used 
to enter the U.S. visa-free under the VWP. 
 
o  Australian 
The Australian biometric passport was introduced in October 2005. Like the U.S. version, the chip 
will only have a digital image of the bearer's face as on their passport photo. Airport security has been 
upgraded to allow Australian ePassport bearers to clear immigration controls more rapidly, and face 
recognition technology has been installed at immigration gates. 
 o  Canadian 
Canada has recently introduced biometrics in the use of passports with the help of digitized 
photos. The future passports may contain a chip that holds a picture of the person and personal 
information such as name and date of birth. 
This technology is being used at border crossings that have electronic readers that are able to read 
the chip in the cards and verify the information present in the card and on the passport. This method 
allows for increased efficiency and accuracy of identifying people at the border crossing. CANPASS, 
developed by Canada Border Services Agency, is currently being used by some major airports that have 
kiosks set up to take digital pictures of a person’s eye as a means of identification. 
o  Dutch 
The situation in the Netherlands was quite reasonable at first, but changed to radical and this is 
due to the fact that encryption scheme used to protect the flow of information between the Dutch 
biometric passport and a passport reader was cracked on July 28 2005. 
This is due to the Dutch passport numbering scheme which does not provide sufficient 
randomness to generate a strong enough key to secure the exchange of information between the passport 
and reader. Other passports such as the U.S. passport do not contain this flaw as they use a stronger key 
to encrypt the data exchange. Also, some readers provide shielding for the passport while it is being read, 
thus preventing signal leakage that might be intercepted by another device. 
However, it was an experiment conducted in laboratory conditions, not  in the field where 
immigration officers would have the opportunity to notice the likely damage and/or alterations to the chip 
and the passport booklet. 
“Security mechanisms in the biometric passport” section, mentioned earlier, explains how the 




Figure 3 shows that if no RFID exists in the passport there a standard manual control will be 
initiated. If the document is valid the passport will be checked against a database (like the American one) 
to see if there is any irregularities. If the document is not valid a closer inspection will be done. 
If an RFID tag exists in the passport, one of two things will happen. Either the passport is 
presented to an RFID reader, or there is a manual check of security features. When a manual check is 
performed the passport will be deemed valid if nothing else suspicious appears while it is scanned as an 
MRP. Specifically, the data page, passport covers and the passport in general are inspected. When the 
passport is presented to an RFID reader, digital signatures will be checked. If these are not valid a closer 
inspection is preformed, if they are valid the MRZ will be compared with the information in the chip to 
see if there is anything suspicious there. If everything is OK the check against the database (watch list) 





o  RFID (chip): Radio Frequency IDentifier (chip) is a family of small chips that are capable of 
permanently and/or temporarily store information and duplex communication with a reader using 
radio waves. 
 
o  MRTD: Machine-Readable Travel Documents, an abbreviation used by the ICAO, meaning 
machine-readable passports, visas and official travel documents. The machine readable information is at present either contained in a machine-readable code or a Contactless Integrated 
Circuit (IC), i.e. an RFID chip. 
 
o  MRP: Machine-Readable Passport. See also the definition of MRTDs above, as a MRP is an 
example of an MRTD. MRP is the foundation for the new ePassport. 
 
o  MRZ: The Machine-Readable Zone is the two lines on the bottom of the MRP data page. These 
lines can be read by machine and contains some of the same information as is written on the rest 
of the data page. 
 
o  Digital Signature:  
The encryption/decryption concept embodied in the ICAO PKI specification is “asymmetric”. In 
this concept keys are issued in pairs consisting of a private key and a public key. The passport issuing 
authority uses the private key (so called because it is held only by the issuer and kept secret) to encrypt 
the computed “hash” of the data in the chip, and the result is the “digital signature”. 
With a digital signature the data is doubly protected. First, the digital signature can be decrypted 
back to the hash value, but only with the use of a “key” that was made available by the authority that 
entered the data in the chip. If the issuing authority’s key successfully decrypts the signature, then it is 
certain that the data in the chip was entered there by that authority. Conversely, if the key does not 
decrypt the signature, it is evident that the data was entered by someone else. 
Second, the mechanical reader recalculates the hash of the data in the chip and compares the 
result to the decrypted digital signature. If the two values are the same, then it is certain that the data has 
not been altered in any way. Conversely, if the values are not the same, it is evident that the data was 
altered by an unauthorized person. 
 
Figure 3. Typical Business Process for reading ePassports 
 
 
The process of implementing ePassports in Romania 
  
The biometric passport it is expected to be released in Romania by the end of this year and it will 
cost approximately 60 Euros. Also it was announced that  the electronic ID cards will be used starting the 
year 2008. 
It was stated that the reason of this delay (because it was forecasted the new passports will be 
ready to use by January 1
st, 2007) with implementing the new passport was due to the fact that the actual 
passports are secure and that there is no need to rush the process of introducing the new type of passport. 
  Also the auction that will designate the company that will be in charge with the producing of 
these passports will take place in the summer of 2007. 
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